Game Theory and Strategic Interaction: How to Make Strategy More Response-Aware
Game Theory and Strategic Interaction examines how strategy changes once outcomes depend on the choices, expectations, and responses of other actors rather than on isolated decision-making alone. The article argues that serious strategy must account for interdependence: competitors react, partners negotiate, regulators intervene, and stakeholders cooperate, defect, imitate, or retaliate in ways that reshape the value of any move. It develops this through the core elements of a game, mixed-interest environments, equilibrium, the prisoner’s dilemma, repeated interaction, coordination problems, signaling, mechanism design, and the limits of overly formal models. The article emphasizes that better strategic ideas are not only analytically strong, but interaction-aware: they consider incentives, information, response patterns, and the possibility that better outcomes may require changing the rules of the game rather than merely playing harder within them.









